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The continuing decline in the cost-per-megabyte of hard disk storage has inevitably led to
a ballooning volume of data that needs to be reviewed in digital investigations. The result:
case backlogs that commonly stretch for months at forensic labs, and per-case processing
that occupies days or weeks of analytical effort. Yet speed is critical in situations where
delay may render the evidence useless or endanger personal safety, such as when a sus-
pect may ﬂee, a victim is at risk, criminal tactics or control infrastructure may change, etc.
In these and other cases, investigators need tools to enable quick triage of computer ev-
idence in order to answer urgent questions, maintain the pace of an investigation and
assess the likelihood of acquiring pertinent information from the device.
This paper details the design and application of a tool, OpenLV, that not only meets the needs
for speedy initial triage, but also can facilitate the review of digital evidence at later stages of
investigation. With OpenLV, an investigator can quickly and safely interact with collected
evidence,muchas if theyhadsatdownat thecomputerat the time theevidencewascollected.
Since OpenLV works without modifying the evidence, its use in triage does not preclude
subsequent, in-depth forensic analysis. Unlikemany popular forensics tools, OpenLV requires
little training and facilitates a unprecedented level of interaction with the evidence.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
In today’s increasingly connected world, criminal in-
vestigations are likely to entail a digital component at some
stage of the process. Even an investigation of purely physical
crimes, such as murder, commonly incorporate the analysis
of digital evidence, ranging from cell phone records to the
victim’s email messages. Unfortunately, the personnel
trained to perform forensic analysis of these digital artifacts
are over-taxed and the inﬂux of cases leads to backlogs. Yet
timely action may be important to hold criminals account-
able for their actions or to protect others from further harm.ity, 5000 Forbes Ave,
kaplan@alumni.cmu.
er).
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSVarious forensics process models have been proposed
since DFRWS in 2001 (Reith et al., 2002; Palmer, 2001;
Carrier and Spafford, 2003; Beebe and Clark, 2005), but
these generally assume that the entire, lengthy process is
performed. A later stage common to most models is tech-
nical analysis, a stage that necessitates trained specialists
and creates the backlog of work already noted. In reaction,
the application of the medical ﬁeld’s concept of triage has
been proposed in order to quickly assign degrees of impor-
tance and urgency to items (Rogers et al., 2006; Casey et al.,
2009).With respect to digital forensics, triage typically refers
to rapid analysis, possibly on-scene, of digital evidence, with
steps to maintain the integrity of the evidence. Since the
evidence is preserved, triage does not obviate later, extended
analysis using a forensic model. Digital forensic triage can
provide investigative leads in a timely manner so that they
can be acted upon while still applicable.. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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nize potential digital evidence. However, the typically
prescribed action for the responder is to collect the evi-
dence (placing a hard drive in an anti-static bag, for
example) or to secure the scene until trained personnel
arrive to conduct the acquisition. In either case, the next
venue for the digital media is the inbound queue of a fo-
rensics lab. This “ﬁnd and forward” approach places a heavy
burden on the lab and its trained personnel. In addition,
under this model, the investigator is at the mercy of the lab,
often waiting for results in order to further the investiga-
tion. A triage model that allows the ﬁrst-responder or the
investigator to generate leads, can not only facilitate faster
investigation but could also inform and accelerate analysis
by the trained lab technician. Triage does not supplant
traditional forensics processes or tools, but can augment
and enhance the investigative process.
The primary contribution of this paper is a description
of a tool, OpenLV, designed and deployed over the past six
years under the name “LiveView.” OpenLV aims to meet the
demand for an easy-to-use triage tool. As such, OpenLV’s
target audience is digital forensics practitioners, in-
vestigators, and ﬁrst-responders, though OpenLV has also
been used extensively in training and educational settings.
OpenLV is a free, 100% GPL-licensed tool.1 Over the past few
years, LiveView has been downloaded hundreds of times
per week since originally released. A 2008 survey indicated
that 30% of universities and 22% of digital forensics prac-
titioners use the tool in some way (Tu et al., 2012). In
addition to incremental updates, such as supporting the
use of forensic images of current versions of Windows, the
most recent version of OpenLV notably adds support for
analysts using Linux to run OpenLV, support for VirtualBox
virtualization software, and the ability to handle Cached
Domain Credentials (discussed in Section Windows
passwords). After years of development, OpenLV is a
mature product that not only addresses a digital forensics
need, but does so while giving users options regarding host
operating system and virtualization software.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure.
We ﬁrst discuss background material in Section
Background. In Section OpenLV, we describe the design and
usage of OpenLV. Section Windows passwords describes a
particular feature of OpenLV, removing the obstacle of
authentication in password-protected evidence. Then, in
Section Limitations, we provide limitations to the current
implementation of OpenLV. We discuss related work in
Section Related work and future work in Section Future
work. Finally, we conclude in Section Conclusion.
Background
Forensics is often divided into classes, Live and Tradi-
tional (or “dead”). Live forensics shares many concepts with
incident response (Jones et al., 2006). The user interacts
with a running computer in order to identify leads and
determine the next investigative steps. Since interacting
with the computer necessarily changes its state, purists1 OpenLV may be obtained at http://www.openlv.org/.often shun live forensics. However, the advent of purely
memory-resident malware or the need to acquire in-use
encryption keys offer little alternative to conducting live
forensics (Vidas, 2007; Kaplan, 2008).
Conversely, traditional digital forensics often dictates the
duplication of media prior to any other interaction (Jones
et al., 2006). Some evidence collection procedures demand
that running computers beunplugged frompower inorder to
prevent changes to the hard disk during the shutdown pro-
cess (Best practices for seizing electronic evidence, 2002). A
duplicatecopyofevidence isoftencalledan image. A forensics
image ismadebycopyingdata to a secondphysical harddrive
or to one of many forensic ﬁles types. A dd or (raw) image is
created by simply copying data blocks from the target device
to a ﬁle. Other ﬁle types improve upon this simple copy
strategy by improving redundancy, storing metadata, and
reducingﬁle sizewith compression. In addition to thedd/raw
ﬁle type, popular ﬁle types include Guidance Software’s
proprietary E01 format and the open Advanced Forensics
Format (AFF) (Garﬁnkel et al., 2006). When creating forensic
images, the creatormaychoose toduplicate the entiredisk, or
some subset such as a disk partition.
In additional to the general digital forensics landscape
that guided the creation of OpenLV, we also provide some
foundation surrounding modern virtualization platforms.
VMware produced one of the earliest virtualization products
for personal computers and now maintains a leading line of
commercial products. VMware offers free and commercial
products targeting desktop users (as opposed to data cen-
ters) in the form of itsWorkstation, Player, Fusion and Server
range of virtualization platforms. Competing products also
exist in free and commercial forms, such as Microsoft’s Vir-
tual PC, Parallels’ Desktop, and Oracle’s VirtualBox. For
brevity, we provide background on the underlying me-
chanics of VMware’s implementation, but general principles
hold for most of these desktop virtualization products.
Fundamentally, virtualization software allows for the
emulation of general computing hardware, such as the CPU,
graphics card, hard disk drive, etc, on a host computer
system. In this way, one physical machine (the host) can be
used to runmultiple instances of various operating systems
each within a virtual machine (VM). The VMs each run
independently from other VMs and all external interaction
via network or human interface devices is mediated by the
virtualization software.
Structurally, on the host, virtual machines typically
consist of two core components2: a virtual hardware
speciﬁcation and a data store. VMware’s desktop products
store the virtual machine speciﬁcation in a plain-text .vmx
ﬁle. This ﬁle dictates what hardware settings will available
to the virtual machine. For example, as shown in Fig. 1, the
.vmx ﬁle may specify the amount of RAM, if a virtual ﬂoppy
disk drive is to be present, and BIOS settings.
Similarly, thedatastorespeciﬁcationsreside inaplain-text
conﬁguration ﬁle. This vmdk ﬁle speciﬁes the type of virtual
drive and information about its disk geometry. VMware
products support different types of virtual disks. When2 There may be other ﬁles storing the “physical” memory of the VM,
additional settings, a binary BIOS, snapshots, etc.
Fig. 2. A code snippet from a VMware .vmdk ﬁle specifying a 5.4 GB hard
disk drive. This text ﬁle would be accompanied by a three other ﬁles test-
s00*.vmdk, which together comprise the 5.4 GB of space the VM would
use as an IDE hard disk. The twoGbMaxExtentSparse type creates ﬁles that
are always under 2 GB to accommodate ﬁlesystem limitations on the host.
This is a subset of an example in the vmdk speciﬁcation.
Fig. 1. A small code snipped of a VMware .vmx ﬁle specifying 512 MB of
RAM, no ﬂoppy disk drive attached, and a 5 s BIOS boot delay.
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20GB virtual diskwhich results in a corresponding 20 GB ﬁle
on the host. Alternately, one can create a “SPARSE” disk that
will startmuch smaller on the host, but bepresented as20GB
in the VM. Fig. 2 shows a portion of a vmdk for a 5.4 GB disk
(this example comes from the vmdk spec3). Different prod-
ucts also support different variations on this theme or even
permit a physical disk to be dedicated to the VM.
OpenLV
An investigation may beneﬁt from having professionals
of varying experience working together toward the com-
mon goal. Different models of interaction have been sug-
gested (BemandHuebner, 2007; Yasinsac et al., 2003), often
positing that less experienced usersmaybe able to assist the
investigative process, despite a lack of training or domain-
speciﬁc knowledge. OpenLV was created with exactly this
use-case in mind. In order to reduce the load on specialists,
OpenLV must be easy to use by investigators with little
digital forensics training. Likewise, the investigator must be
able to work with the tool to quickly identify leads.
OpenLV is a tool written in Java that facilitates the
loading of digital forensics images into a virtualization
platform. The straightforward graphical user interface re-
quires the user to conﬁgure only a handful of settings, many
of which are pre-populated with reasonable settings. Fig. 3
shows the main interface, where the user can conﬁgure the
amount of memory, system time, operating system, and the
location of the input evidence and output virtualization
ﬁles. Some settings, such as the size of the virtual hard disk,
are inferred from the input evidence. Many of the system-
speciﬁc settings are written to a new virtualization
conﬁguration ﬁle. Once conﬁgured, the user invokes the
virtualization software and interacts with the evidence
system as with any virtual machine (as shown in Fig. 4).
Virtual machine speciﬁcation
Many of the user-conﬁgurable settings seen in Fig. 3
translate directly to the virtual machine speciﬁcation. The
settings shown in Fig. 3 would result in a .vmx ﬁle shown
in Fig. 5. A vmdk ﬁle representing the single IDE hard disk is
created in the user-speciﬁed output directory. VM memory
is deﬁned as 512 (MB) as speciﬁed (this setting was also
pre-populated). Several time-related settings are also
speciﬁed in order to prevent the virtualization software
from syncing the VM clock with the host clock.
In Fig. 3 the user has speciﬁed “Windows XP” for the VM
operating system. OpenLV presents a list of operating3 VMware’s vmdk spec can be found at http://www.vmware.com/
support/developer/vddk/vmdk\_50\_technote.pdf?src¼vmdk.systems supported by the installed virtualization platform
(including all modern Windows versions), but also permits
automatic operating system detection. If the user selects
“Automatic,” OpenLV will attempt to automatically deter-
mine Windows operating system types in the evidence by
querying the ProductName value in the HKLM\SOFTWAR-
E\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion registry key.
Virtual disk creation
For dd/raw images, OpenLV creates a vmdk ﬁle with
settings that map the areas of the image to that of a virtual
disk. The partition table is read from the Master Boot Re-
cord (MBR) in the image and the appropriate calculationsFig. 3. The main interface for OpenLV. The user is able to boot a virtual
machine from either forensic image ﬁle(s) or from a physical disk. Several
virtual machine settings, such as the system time, are conﬁgurable.
Fig. 4. The end result of using OpenLV with collected evidence is a virtual
machine ready for user interaction. In this case the host machine is a Fedora
17 Linux host with VirtualBox virtualization software, and the collected
image ﬁle is Windows XP.
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formation in the vmdk. The AMD-XP evidence speciﬁed in
Fig. 3 is a “split image,” meaning that when the evidence
was collected, the responder elected to capture the evi-
dence split into several ﬁles instead of one. This might be
done to keep each ﬁle under a speciﬁc size to meet ﬁl-
esystem limitations, or to permit storage on DVD, etc. A set
of dd/raw split images can be recombined into a single dd/
raw image simply by concatenating all the split images intoFig. 5. The resulting .vmx from the settings speciﬁed in Fig. 3. In addition to
setting the time, options are set to prevent the virtualization software from
subsequently updating the time.one. However, this would require twice the storage space
on the host machine. Instead of requiring concatenation,
OpenLV creates a vmdk mapping the split images together.
The resulting virtual disk speciﬁcation can be seen in Fig. 6.
The monolithicFlat type speciﬁes a pre-allocated
disk. This way the virtualization software will utilize the
dd/raw forensic image as if it was a ﬂat virtual disk type
created for a virtual machine. The lines beginning with RW,
denote the hard disk extents. The RW indicates that the
data areas are readable and writable, the numeric values
reﬂect data area (in sectors), the AMDXP.00? are the split
images the user speciﬁed, and the 0 is the offset into the
image that data begins. The data areas must be marked as
writable so that the virtualization software will permit the
guest OS to perform writes; mitigating alteration of evi-
dence will be discussed in Section Booting the VM.
Partition images are handled similarly, but a partition
does not contain enough information for a virtualization
platform to boot the operating system. For this reason, a
basic MBR compatible with the operating system is added to
a virtual diskmapped to the partition image. SomeMicrosoft
Windows operating systems require the serial number to be
present in the MBR, for these systems, the MBR is further
modiﬁed to include this value as speciﬁed by the ﬁrst four
bytes of the HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices registry key.
For physical devices, the vmdk is prepared slightly
differently, specifying a physical disk instead of a virtual
disk; virtual machines can be backed by a real, physical
disk. For these types of images the local drives attached to
the system are queried (e.g. \\.\PhysicalDrive)
including IDE, USB, Firewire, etc. devices. When the user
selects a physical drive from the drop-down selection
menu, OpenLV creates a physical disk vmdk ﬁle specifying
the appropriate attached device.
For other types of images, OpenLV relies upon third
party software to interpret the image. Commercial software
such as Mount Image Pro, FTK Imager, or Guidance Soft-
ware’s Physical Disk Emulator are capable of interpreting
many types of images. Using this software, images that are
not in dd/raw format can be mounted in such a way that
they appear to the host system as physical devices. In this
way, OpenLV can use these images to create virtual ma-
chines just as OpenLV uses physical devices.Fig. 6. The resulting .vmx from the settings speciﬁed in Fig. 3. This particular
image is a “split image” consisting of four dd/raw ﬁles.
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Regardless of evidence type, once the virtual machine
settings are fully conﬁgured a VM snapshot is created. The
creation of a snapshot prevents the virtualization software
from attempting to perform disk writes to the evidence
data, highly desirable behavior for a forensic tool. As the
user interacts with the evidence, disk writes are re-directed
to a differential snapshot ﬁle by the virtualization software.
This way the VM executes without error even if the logical
ﬁles aremarked read-only in host ﬁlesystem, or if a physical
disk is connected via a hardware write-blocker.
If an Intel-compatible driver is not already present in
the image, OpenLV immediately, prior to boot, takes
advantage of this snapshot to install a Intel-compatible disk
driver. Without this driver, booting the virtual machine in
an emulated Intel BX440 environment (as VMWare does)
would result in the infamous “blue screen of death.” Since
the virtual machine is not yet executing, the standard
driver installation process cannot be followed. Instead the
appropriate driver is extracted from an existing cab ﬁle
found in the image, or a surrogate is copied into the virtual
hard disk drive. Then several registry keys are added to the
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE hive so that the driver is loaded
with the CurrentControlSet.
In addition to the evidence-preserving snapshot, several
design decisions were made with digital forensics in mind.
For example, the resultant virtual machine has no network
interface conﬁgured. This precludes communications to or
from themachinewith remote systems on the Internet, and
the machine is not able to interact with any external ser-
vice. The user may later add a host-only or even Internet-
reaching network connection using standard conﬁgura-
tion tools. Similarly, when specifying a disk image as input,
OpenLV will check the ﬁle system to see if the image ﬁles
are marked as read-only, and if not, prompts the user with
an offer to set this attribute. Setting image ﬁles to read-only
is generally a good practice for forensic data, and adds a
layer of protection to collected evidence.
OpenLV allows the examiner to specify the date and
internal clock time the virtual system will start with, and
conﬁgures the virtualization platform to refrain from
updating the time. This feature has a range of applications,
from preserving the functionality of time-limited software
to avoiding time-triggered operations that could affect
system state that the examiner wants to preserve.
Use cases
The ﬂexibility to work with a variety of image formats
means OpenLV can be used throughout the investigative
process. Even users with specialized forensics training may
use OpenLV for a variety of reasons including speed, the
ability to use live-response tools or access to software
installed in the evidence system.
Field users can interact with computers on-scene to
obtain investigative leads without the risk of modifying
potential evidence. Similarly, ﬁeld users can use OpenLV to
aid in determining if the computer warrants further analysis.
Without a safe way to analyze media on-site, all available
digital media may be sent wholesale to a forensics lab,further contributing to the lab backlog. When assessing
computers on-site, OpenLV’s capability to use physical disks
to create VMs allows responders to connect hard disk drives
to a hardware write-blocker and safely boot a virtualized
system for review. Since these physical drives are original
evidence (not copied), the use of a hardwarewrite-blocker is
recommended to preserve the candidate evidence.
Field users may have some training or possess basic PC
administration skills. These users may use OpenLV to
interact with candidate evidence using incident response
or administration tools and techniques.
Lab users can quickly assess the state of the machine at
collection time. The lab user will often have access to
specialized digital forensics tools capable of listing the ﬁles
present on the desktop, displaying the desktop background
image, and enumerating themost recently used documents.
However, using OpenLV, all of this information is immedi-
ately available to the user after the virtual machine starts.
Encountering uncommon software and data formats can
drastically slowan investigation. Consider special accounting
or computer-aided design software. Such software is expen-
sive and may use ﬁle types that analysis tools cannot readily
interpret. Worse, ﬁle types may be readable only by versions
of software that are no longer be available, and the vendors
may be uncooperative or even defunct. By using OpenLV, the
software thatwas already installed on the acquired computer
can be used to open and view ﬁles found in the image.
Forensics professionals presenting evidence in courtroom
settings can also use OpenLV to illustrate ﬁndings from
examined computers in amorenatural, easilygraspedway for
anon-technical audience. In thecourtroom, theusercaneasily
demonstrate interaction, repeatedly if necessary, including
the use of any specialized software residing on the system.
OpenLV’s ﬂexibility and ease of use has led to its appli-
cation in a variety of unanticipated settings, from data re-
covery to gaining access to encrypted drives (Butler, 2009;
Geiger, 2008).
Windows passwords
Computer passwords impede interaction with the evi-
dence, the primary goal of OpenLV. So, OpenLV takes steps to
remove this barrier. Windows local user account passwords
canbeblanked, effectivelymaking theseaccounts password-
less for the examiner using OpenLV. For machines that are
joined to aWindowsDomain, the cacheddomain credentials
can be blanked, similarly removing login obstacles. Still, it
may be useful in the investigation to recover the user’s
password, either because the credentials may be reused
elsewhere or because the password used is important in it-
self. For this reason, OpenLV can export the original,
cryptographically-protected credentials for use in password
cracking software. The remainder of this section details the
exportation and blanking of these Windows credentials.
Local passwords
Local passwords are stored in a hashed form in the Se-
curityAccountsManager (SAM) registryﬁle. Combinedwith
information from the SYSTEM registry hive, these hashes
can be extracted, and the accounts’ passwords can be set to
Fig. 7. Static descrambling key used to derive the system bootkey, required as part of password decryption. This key is the same for all instances of the Windows
operating system.
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necessary to extract and blank local passwords with a sys-
tem that is “protected” with a bootkey (also called syskey).
The bootkey is retrieved from the SYSTEM hive. The
bootkey is stored across several registry keys each under
\\Control\\Lsa in the current ControlSet: JD, Skwe1,
GBG, and Data. For each of these keys, data is stored as 16
UTF-16LE bytes. From a practical standpoint, this means that
the hexadecimal representation of the bytes are stored one
character at a time and are separated by 0. For example, the
value 0x157b is stored in the registry as ‘1’,‘0’,‘5’,‘0’,‘7’,‘0’,‘b’.
Once the values are obtained from the various SYSTEM
keys, the resulting data must then be descrambled using a
static key, shown in Fig. 7. The nth byte of the bootkey is
derived by using the nth byte of the static key as an index
into the bytes retrieved from the registry. Therefore, the
ﬁrst byte of the bootkey will always be the 8th byte of the
recovered data (the ﬁrst byte of the static key is 0x8).
With the bootkey value calculated, the hashed bootkey
can be retrieved from the SAM and decrypted. The MD5
hashed bootkey is 32 bytes of encrypted data residing 0x80
bytes into \\SAM\\Domain\\Account\\F. To decrypt,
OpenLV ﬁrst extracts 16 bytes from 0x70 bytes into the
same registry value. The MD5 update function4 is used to
transform the hash using these 16 bytes, then updated
again with the bytes represented in Fig. 8(keyA), then with
the bootkey recovered previously, and ﬁnally the bytes
represented in Fig. 8(keyB). The resulting MD5 is then used
as an RC4 key to decrypt the hashed bootkey.
Each local user’s password is cleared in the SAM ﬁle
found in the image. For each user, the user’s RID is deter-
mined from registry settings. This RID is used to update the
\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\RID\\V key for
each user. Setting the LM (offset 0xa0) and NT (offset 0xac)
structures to 0 indicates that these users have no password.
The hashed bootkey previously recovered is used to
decrypt each password hash in the SAM for export and
possible password cracking. The encrypted LM and NT
passwords are DES encrypted as a function of the users RID.
Key1 is comprised of bytes 0–3 of the RID, then bytes 0–2 of
the RID (again). Key2 is comprised of byte 3 of the RID,
followed by bytes 0–2 and 0–2 again. The ﬁrst hash block is
decrypted with the DES algorithm under Key1, and the
second hash is decrypted with DES under Key2. For a
syskey protected machine, an RC4 key is derived from a
magic string (“LMPASSWORD” for LM hashes, “NTPASS-
WORD” for NT hashes). This RC4 key is used to decrypt the
data prior to the two DES decryptions.
The software used to perform the above decryption is
lengthy and complex. Pseudo-code detailing local pass-
word recovery is shown in the Appendix A.4 MD5 is a block-based hashing algorithm. The update function is used
to continue an existing hash calculation with a new block. The digest
function is used to complete a hash calculation.Domain passwords
For machines that are part of a domain, authentication is
not performed against the local SAM. Instead, authentication
is performed against a network server known as a Domain
Controller. When authenticating against a Domain
Controller,Windows caches the domain credentials for up to
10of themost recentusers to authenticate fromthemachine.
The mechanics OpenLV implements for clearing cached
domain credentials are similar to those described for the
local accounts. The registry hives that Windows uses to
store these credentials are different, as is the overall algo-
rithm. However, the same basic hashing and cryptography
primitives are employed as is the methodology of storing
components in various registry locations.
Unlike the local SAM described above, the Local Security
Authority (LSA) secrets for cached domain credentials are
stored in the SECURITY hive. In particular, the LSA secret
named NL$KM is retrieved and then decrypted using the
aforementioned bootkey, and a Policy Secret Encryption
Key (PSEK). The PSEK is obtained from \\Policy\\-
PolSecretEncryptionKey\\@. An MD5 is created with
system bootkey, then it is MD5 updated 1000 times with
the PSEK. The resulting MD5 is used to create an RC4 key to
decrypt the ﬁnal value of the LSA key. The LSA key is used to
DES decrypt the NL$KM secret. A Java code section showing
the algorithm can be seen in Fig. 9.
Blanking a cached domain credential is not as simple as
setting the value to 0. Instead the password is set to anMD4
hash derived from the empty string, updated with the
digest of the string (in this case empty), and ﬁnally the
username. Involving the username in this calculation,
essentially a salt, requires OpenLV to calculate a “blank
password” hash for each user.
Limitations
OpenLV’s origins are fairly Windows-centric. Early ver-
sions of OpenLV only ran on aWindows host, and only with
VMware Server or Workstation. Similarly, automatic oper-
ating system detection and password blanking only worked
on Windows evidence. Even then, certain versions of
Windows evidence presented additional complications. For
example, localWindows password blanking was limited for
Windows NT and cached credentials may only work on
Windows NT4, 2000, XP and 2003.
The current version of OpenLV runs on Linux and
Windows hosts. Even though the core of OpenLV is written
in platform-independent Java, OpenLV interacts with the
installed virtualization software in system-speciﬁc ways.
OpenLV supports a variety of VMware products and Ora-
cle’s VirtualBox, each on both host platforms.
As discussed above, OpenLV only natively supports
physical devices and dd/raw image types. For other forensic
image types, such as Guidance Software’s E01 format,
additional software is needed to interpret the image type.
Fig. 8. Static strings used to update an MD5 hash derived from the SAM, speciﬁc to a particular user. This hash is updated using data from the registry, keyA, the
system bootkey, and keyB, in that order.
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third party software, such as MountImage Pro, presents the
image data as a physical device usable by OpenLV.
In many cases, OpenLV must be run with Administrator
or root permissions. For instance, on a Windows host, the
PhysicalDevice objects cannot be enumerated without
Administrative permission. Likewise, the mechanism for
performing registry edits requires Administrative permis-
sions. Special cases, such as secondary data disks and
multi-boot systems are not handled as well as the typical
case: A Windows machine with a single partition.
While not a limitation speciﬁc to OpenLV, it is worth
noting that when using OpenLV in a form of ﬁrst-response
that rebooting a suspect machine will result in a loss of
volatile information. For this reason, responders should
create a formal response plan prior to arriving on-scene.
Such a plan may well include some form of memory cap-
ture early in the response process.
Related work
Rogers et al. (2006) proposed a ﬁeld triage process
model for digital forensics. The authors observe that in
some investigations time is of the essence, and quickly
developing leads may be of utmost importance. The triage
concept, borrowed from the medical ﬁeld, is applied to
digital forensics as a “process in which things are ranked in
terms of importance or priority.” OpenLV can be used in
such a model to inform the decisions on what evidence
deserves analytical priority.
Bern and Huebner (2007) suggest employing two teams,
each possessing different skills and tools. These two teams
work in tandem and the authors suggest that this may lead
to faster results, though no concrete evidence is given.
Similarly, Yasinsac et al. (2003) documented the concept of
having professionals with various educational backgroundsFig. 9. Code section from OpenLV used to obtain the Local Security Authority
(LSA) key, derived from the system bootkey and the Policy Secret Encryption
Key (PSEK). This key can be used to decrypt LSA secrets found in the registry.work collaboratively on a digital forensic investigations.
Four classes of professional are detailed each possessing
familiarity, understanding, or deep knowledge in sets of
digital forensics knowledge. Those with little familiarity
and only general understanding of forensics processes can
beneﬁt from tools like OpenLV, which enable them to
contribute more to the investigative process.
Huebner et al. (2007) suggest recreating the environment
being investigated as closely as possible. The authors admit
that the accuracy of this recreation is impossible to measure,
and use OpenLV software as an example of a step in the right
direction. The authors also mention that the investigation of
a recreated environment using a tool like OpenLV could be
performed in parallel with traditional tools.
Penhallurick (2005) outlined a workﬂow and manual pro-
cess for creating virtual machines from forensic disk images,
including a technique for resolving virtual hardware conﬂicts.
OpenLV software has been incorporated into various
research projects. For example, OpenLV has been cited in
books about open source digital forensics (Altheide and
Carvey, 2011), used for malware forensics (Aquilina et al.,
2008), and employed in digital forensics education (Pollitt
et al., 2008; Hay et al., 2008). In 2007, Hargreaves and
Chivers use OpenLV to investigate issues a new operating
system may present to digital investigations. Lillard and
Garrison (2010) even advocate the use of dd/raw images
speciﬁcally for compatibility with OpenLV.
Mrdovic suggests combining static and dynamic digital
forensics analysis techniques (Mrdovic et al., 2009). Occa-
sionally there is a desire to execute software from with a
forensic image. This presents obvious problems to the
integrity of evidence and in the technical ability to execute
the software. OpenLV is mentioned as a method to permit
this type of interaction with the evidence.Future work
For six years, OpenLV only supportedWindows as a host
platform. With new support for a host operating system
unencumbered by commercial licensing restrictions,
OpenLV can be bundled as part of a “live CD.” Speciﬁcally,
support for VirtualBox and Linux enables OpenLV to be
bundled as part of a bootable CD that can be used for triage.
Such a CD, combined with a sufﬁcient RAM disk or a USB
thumb drive to which the virtual disk writes can be
directed, could allow inspection of a target machine
without physically removing the hard disk drive.
OpenLV currently supports Windows and Linux host
platforms. Some may prefer OSX as an analysis host, and
future support is planned. Similarly, several features are
clearly oriented toward Windows systems, notably the
password-blanking features that only work on Windows
images. These features could be expanded to handle plat-
forms such as Linux.
T. Vidas et al. / Digital Investigation 11 (2014) S45–S53S52Many users employ formats such as AFF or E01 as a stan-
dardpractice. Inorder touseOpenLVwith these formats, third
party tools must be used to emulate a physical device. If
OpenLVhadbuilt-in support for these formats,OpenLVwould
be easier for these users to incorporate into their workﬂow.Conclusion
OpenLV permits rapid triage of computer systems in the
ﬁeld in a fashion that does not degrade their forensic value.
Empowering ﬁeld personnel with no specialized forensic
training to review digital artifacts without delay maintains
the velocity of time-sensitive investigations.
The ﬂexibility and usability of OpenLV lends to unan-
ticipated use-cases. OpenLV enables easy presentation ofFig. A.10. Pseudo-code demonstrating the local account password extrevidence in the courtroom and has found a home in digital
forensics education.
OpenLV may also help alleviate critical resource con-
straints in investigations that involve the review of digital
evidence. By enabling investigators to review evidentiary
computer systems in a natural fashion, OpenLV can accel-
erate the discovery of relevant data. The alternative is, too
often, an iterative process that requires investigators to wait
for information to be produced by forensic personnel in
response to their requests. In this context, OpenLV comple-
ments, rather than replaces, traditional forensic analysis.Appendix A. Local Windows account password
blanking.action and blanking for a system with bootkey (syskey) enabled.
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